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PUBLIC WORKS, FEDERAL GRANTS, AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE
1PUBLIC-PRIVATE CONSTRUCTION
The familiar and most obvious characteristic of the construction industry
is its cyclical variability. Outlay on new construction was $12.1 billion in
1926 and $2.9 billion in 1933. The variability is even greater in new private
construction (Table 27 and Chart 10): outlay was $9.9 billion in 1926
and $1.2 billion in 1933 —arelative drop of 88 percent; total construction
fell 76 percent. In 1939 prices (Table 27), the drop in private construction
was 85 percent and in total, 71 percent. During the 1920's private con-
struction reached a peak, declining slowly after 1926 and rapidly after
1929. Public construction, however, continued to grow after 1926; the
peak in current value was not reached until 1930, and the peak in physical
volume not until 1931. But then, as the depression deepened, it fell sharply.
In the years after 1933 private construction expanded slowly and in
1940 amounted to $5.1 biffion —52percent of its peak in 1926. During
World War II expenditure fell to $2.0 billion (in 1943), not much above
the depression low. It recovered sharply thereafter, but in 1939 dollars
the volume in 1948 was 30 percent below that of 1926.
The behavior of new public construction since 1933 has been at least
equally remarkable. From 1933 up to and including 1940 it grew fairly
steadily, and, since private construction remained far below previous levels,
comprised nearly 50 percent of total construction (instead of 21 percent
as in the mid-1920's). With World War II public construction soared,
reaching $10.7 billion in1942.It dropped sharply to $2.4 billion —in
1945. By 1949 it had reached approximately $6.4 billion, the highest
dollar outlay in any peacetime year, though in physical volume it was below
the level of four of the five years 193 6_40.1
1Ifthe comparisons throughout were in real instead of money terms, the variation
would be reduced, especially for the years after 1940. The tabulation indicates the
most significant differences between the real and the money figures.
RELATIVE VOLUME OF NEW CoNsmuc-rIoN
1926 1927 1933 1940 1947 1948 1949
Current Prices
Total 100 99 24 72 137 179 187
Private 100 97 12 51 132 168 163
Public 100 114 81 172 167 234 305
1939 Prices
Total 100 100 28 71 82 87 94
Private 100 97 16 50 68 80 81
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Shaded areas represent contractions, white areas, expansions of business cycles according to NBER chronology..
Source: Table 27,
Itappears, then, that the effect of public construction on the economy as'.
a whole and on the construction industry in the great depression 1929-33
was mixed. If the downturn in economic activity had been slight,
upswing in public construction 1928-31 might have proved to be an ade-
quate corrective. In fact the impact of the depression was not slight;
1926-30 private construction fell much more than public
constructionshrank instead of expanding to
off set the continuing decline in private construction.2 After 1933, indeed,.
2Inthe first two years of depression, 1930-3 1, public construction was stimulated by
the efforts of the President's Employment Committee headed by Colonel Arthur














1915 '20 '25 '30 '40 '45 '50kPUBLIC WORKS, GRANTS, AND BUSINESS CYCLES 75
public construction grew and thereby added to employment, but until the
war the expansion in real terms was not enough to bring the total level up
to that of the late 1920's. An attempt will next be made to analyze in more
detail the comparative behavior of federal and of state-local expenditure
for construction.
A Depression Shrinkage of State-Local Construction
Public construction is divisible into (a) federal and (b) state and local.
The most obvious fact brought out by Table 28 and Chart 11 is that federal
construction has dominated public construction during wars. In 1918 and
again in 1941-45 it was over 70 percent of the total. In the late 1920's
federal construction fell to less than 10 percent, and the mild depressions
of 1923-24 and of 1926-27 do not appear to have affected the federal share.
But with the severe depression after 1929, the federal share rose sharply
and continued at a high relative level throughout the 1930's, partly because
of an absolute expansion of federal expenditures and partly because state-
local expenditure remained low after 1932. It is interesting to reflect that
if state-local expenditure for construction had in 1933 expanded in real
terms over the 1927 level relatively as much as did federal, total construc-
tion, public and private, would have been 20 percent above the 1927 level,
despite a drop in private construction to a sixth of the 1927 level.3
BTypes of Public Construction Expenditure
Military and naval construction was relatively unimportant until 1939,
then grew rapidly, being almost half of total public construction in 1942
(Table 29). After World War II it once again became the smallest of the
six general types of public construction. Military and naval construction
will, of course, grow and decline because of needs for national defense and
only by accident will these changes operate to enlarge public construction
in depression and shrink it in prosperity. Accordingly, a subtotal of public
construction, excluding military and naval, is shown in Table 29.
Of the other four distinct types the most important has been highways
which made up over half of the subtotal in the 1920's and up to 1934,
38-46 percent in 1934-40, and much less during the war. Next in impor-
Woods, which expanded the federal program of public works and encouraged state
and local governments to follow this example, although without offering any finan-
cial assistance. This Committee encouraged also some private industries, notably the
utilities, to undertake construction. The bottom fell out of plans and performance
in late 1931.
° levelof on-site employment would have been 22 percent lower than in 1927.
This figure is obtained by analyzing the estimates of employment by J. K. Gaibraith
and 0. 0. Johnson, Jr., The Economic Effects of the Federal Public Works Expendi-











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































tance is nonresidential building, then conservation and development, sew-
age disposal and water supply.4 Conservation and development grew
remarkably 1926-36, declined slightly in 1937-38, recovered 1939-42,
then dropped sharply to 1945. In the postwar years it has expanded rap-
idly. The chief components are expenditure by the Bureau of Reclamation,
the Corps of Engineers, and the TVA. Its growth after 1929 helped to
offset the decline in total construction for several years, but in the 1938
depression it declined. The notable feature of this series is that it indicates
expansion of the area of federal construction. The other three series, high-
ways, sewage and water, nonresidential building, show an irregular, some-
what perverse cyclical behavior characteristic of public construction as a
whole (excluding military and naval). During 1930-31 expenditure for
them held up or expanded, but prolongation of depression brought a sharp
fall in 1932-33. The subsequent rise was interrupted in 1937. During
these years highway expenditure is relatively more stable than the other
series.
Two of these, nonresidential building and all other, were markedLy swelled and the
others reduced by war demands.
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Table29
New Public Construction by Type, 1926-1949
Total Conser- Sewage
Militaryexci. vation & Disposal
&MilitaryHigh- Devel-Nonresi- & WaterAll
TotalNaval& NavalwaysopmentdentialSupplyOther
BILLIONS OF DOLLARS
1926 2,144 1! 2,133 1,067 61 603 285 117
1927 2,409 12 2,397 1,222 63 596 312 204
1928 2,485 15 2,470 1,289 72 638 300 171
1929 2,486 192,467 1,266 115 659 253 174
1930 2,858 292,829 1,516 137 660 343 173
1931 2,659 402,619 1,355 156 612 270 226
1932 1,862 34 1,828 958 150 415 156 149
1933 1,648 36 1,612 847 359 230 95 81
1934 2,211 472,164 1,000 518 363 173 110
1935 2,233 372,196 845 700 328 175 148
1936 3,516 29 3,487 1,362 658 701 342 424
1937 3;o96 37 3,059 1,226 605 550 311 367
1938 3,420 62 3,358 1,421 551 672 355 359
1939 3,809 125 3,684 1,381 570 970 371 392
1940 3,628 385 3,243 1,302 528 615 338 460
1941 5,751 1,6204,101 1,066 5001,646 252 667
1942 10,660 5,016 5,644 734 357 3,685 169 699
1943 6,3222,5503,772 446 285 2,010 107 924
1944 3,073 8372,236 362 163 1,361 79 271
1945 2,398 690 1,708 398 130 937 97 146
1946 2,362 188 2,174 895 240 354 194 491
1947 3,496 2043,292 1,514 394 599 351 434
1948 4,907 1584,7491,856 629 1,301 535 428
1949 6,403 1376,2662,129 793 2,068 619 657
1950 7,113 177 6,936 2,350 8862,402 671 627
RELATIVES1926:100
1926 100 100 100 100 100 100 100. 100
1927 112 109 112 115 103 99 109 174
1928 116 136 116 121 118 106 105 146
1929 116 173 116 119 188 109 89 149
1930 133 264 133 142 224 109 120 143
1931 124 364 123 127 256 101 95 193
1932 92 309 86 90 246 69 55 127
1933 81 327 76 80 589 38 33 69
1934 103 427 102 94 850 60 61 94
1935 104 336 103 79 1,150 54 61 127
1936 164 264 164 128 1,080 116 120 362
1937 144 336 143 115 991 91 109 314
1938 159 564 158 133 903 111 124 307
1939 177 1,136 173 129 935 161 130 335
1940 1693,500 152 122 865 102 119 394
1941 268 14,727 192 100 820 273 88 570
1942 49245,600 264 69 582 612 59 597
1943 29423,182 177 42 467 333 38 790
1944 1437,609 105 34 267 226 28 232
1945 112 6,273 80 37 213 156 34 125
1946 110 1,709 102 84 393 59 68 420
1947 163 1,855 154 142 645 99 123 371
1948 229 1,436 223 174 1,030 216 188 366
1949 299 1,245 294 200 1,300 343 217 562
1950 332 1,609 325 220 1,452 398 235 536
Source: Construction and Construction Materials, May1950, pp. 18-21.80 CHAPTER 4
Which level of government provides the funds for each type of expendi-
ture (Table 28)? The catch-all category 'other', which includes military
and naval, miscellaneous public service enterprises, conservation and de-
velopment, and all other, has been the most important segment of federal
construction since the mid-1930's. It was also most important 1918-21.
Of this category, military and naval construction and conservation and
development —almostentirely federal —havecomprised nine-tenths.
Sewage and water supply has been nonfederal, except in the late 1930's
and early 1940's through PWA, WPA, and Defense Housing. Nonresiden-
tial building and highways divide more evenly. Federal expenditure for the
former became as large as nonfederal in the late 1930's,5 but did not con-
tinue to be after the war. On highways, federal expenditure grew both
absolutely and relatively after 1929 partly by greater construction of fed-
eral roads and partly by larger grants.
Federal grants for public construction moved upward with depression
after 1929, and very sharply upward after 1933 (Table 30). They con-
tinued at a high level until World War II, when the discontinuance of PWA
and WPA narrowed the area. Since the war there has been a new rise and
the present federal aid program for public works covers four main pur-
poses: highways, airports, hospitals, and housing. The first is of long
standing and great importance. The other three are new, the amounts cur-
rently appropriated relatively small, and their treatment here will be brief.
Airports. In 1946 Congress authorized the appropriation of $500 million
for the construction of public airports over a five year period to be appor-
tioned among the states (except for a 25 percent discretionary fund)
according to population and area. Matching was required. The federal
Civil Aeronautics Administrator was permitted to deal directly with local
governments in selecting and approving projects, a step that has been
objected to by representatives of state governments.
During the war, with extensive federal construction of war plants, it greatly exceeded
norifederal.
Table 30
Public Construction, Federal Grants, 1918-1949 (millions of dollars)
1918 10 1926 82 1934 721 1942 475
1919 65 1927 81 1935 567 1943 268
1920 95 1928 85 1936 1,566 1944 126
1921 78 1929 80 1937 1,117 1945 99
1922 78 1930 104 1938 1,320 1946 244
1923 77 1931 235 1939 1,377 1947 422
1924 100 1932 111 1940 946 1948 430
1925 89 1933 286 1941 697 1949 480
1950 482
Source:Construction and Construction Materials, May 1951, p. 18.PUBLIC WORKS, GRANTS, AND BUSINESS CYCLES 81
Hospitals: In 1946 Congress authorized also the appropriation of $375
million to be used as grants for planning and constructing hospitals and
public health centers over a five year period. Since allocation to the states
is based on population and per capita income, states that are deficient in
facilities and in fiscal ability receive larger sums. But all states must spend
$2 to get $1 as a grant; i.e., the federal share is a third.
Housing and Home Finance
Administration might offer capital grantslocal public agencies "to make
land in project areas available for redevelopment at its fair value". The
grants are limited to two-thirds of the net cost of the projects assisted in
the locality and the over-all grant authorization is $100 million a year
for five years.
Highways: Grants for highway construction began in 1916 under a formula
that allocated funds among the states a third each according to population,
area, and rural delivery and 'star route' mileage.6 Matching on a 50-50
basis was required. A system of federal aid mileage (not over 7 percent of
the road mileage of a state) was marked out, split into interstate and inter-
county; a plan of federal supervision was developed; and by 1930, 160,000
miles were eligible for federal aid.
The depression after 1929 brought both expansion and innovation. By
1941 the federal aid system had grown to 235,239 miles. In 1930-32
Congress increased the grants. With the New Deal large sums were made
available for highway construction, both outside and inside the federal aid
system, without matching and for purposes —secondaryroads, urban
roads, etc., —notpreviously eligible. In 1936 Congress turned back toward
regular appropriations, although some depression innovations were re-
tained. With the war, highway construction was sharply reduced.7
In 1944, as a part of postwar planning, Congress framed a new highway
act. Highway depreciation during the war, together with the certainty of a
great postwar increase in traffic, seemed to justify lifting the annual author-
ization (for three years) to $500 million a year.8 It seemed also that in
allocating grants more attention should be given to urban roads and to
secondary or feeder roads; as a result, $125 million was allocated to federal
aid routes in urban areas, $150 million for developing a federal aid system
of secondary roads, and $225 million for primary highways included in the
OIn1921 and later, allocations were altered to favor states with small populations
and states where the unappropriated public lands were over 5percentof the area.
During the war the federal government made grants and spent directly for the con-
struction of access roads and strategic highways.
The authorization in 1939 was $200 million. The three year period for its expendi-
ture has been extended to five.82 CHAPTER 4
federal aid system.9 The significance of thisisthat a large field may have
been opened for expansion of federal aid. At present, however, federal
grants for the construction of public works are well below the level of the
1930's. But the amount and area of direct federal projects has been greatly
enlarged. The Bureau of Reclamation, the Corps of Engineers, and TVA
together spent $744 million for new construction in 1949.
The record of expenditure on new public construction since 1918 covers
one very severe depression and several lesser depressions. For the latter
—1920-21,1923-24, 1926-27, 1937-38 —fewpositive conclusions con-
cerning the countercyclical effect of this spending can be offered. In 1921,
1927, 1930, and 1938 public construction expanded over that of the
preceding year, whereas private construction fell. This is to be explained,
except perhaps in 1930, by the fact that public works, financed by govern-
ment and not for profit, are "less sensitive to business cycles than is pri-
vately financed building. Moreover, they are usually planned, and provision
for meeting their cost is usually made, a considerably longer time before
the initiation of the project than is the case with private construction."°
Concerning the severe depression after 1929 the evidence is more conclu-
sive. Expansion of federal works as soon as the depression started, together
with moral suasion upon state-local governments, swelled public construc-
tion and reduced the drop in total construction. But after 1930, as the
depression deepened, state-local ability and willingness to spend dwindled,
and although federal expenditure for public works continued to grow, it
was too small to offset even the decline in state-local expenditure until
1936. Unless this sequence can be altered, or depressions shortened and
moderated, the applicability of a countercycical theory is limited, since
federal outlay would have to be swelled enough to offset a decline in state-
local, as well as in private, construction. However, the amount and area of
direct federal expenditure is much larger now than it was in the 19 20's. In
particular, federal outlay for conservation and development has grown.
On the other hand, doubts have been expressed in many quarters that the
Corps of Engineers or the officers of the Bureau of Reclamation, left to
themselves, would give much consideration to a countercydical program.1'
°Forsecondary roads, rural population is substituted for total population in the
distribution of a third of the $150 million; for urban highways the distribution of
the $125 million among the states is to be on the basis of population in urban areas
of 5,000 or more.
10Gayer,op. cit.,p.36.
'1The Hoover Commission points out that the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of
Reclamation have frequently presented projects to Congress that were objected to
by the Budget Bureau and that Congress has frequently authorized such projects.
Specifically, of 42 projects turned down by the Budget Bureau, 36 were later author-PUBLIC WORKS, GRANTS, AND BUSINESS CYCLES 83
One other reflection concerns the prospect that the public program will
contract after private construction has recovered. Here the experience of
the 1930's is difficult to distill. Private construction then never approached
the levels of the preceding decade —in1939 it was 4.4 percent of gross
national product; in 1929, 8.0 percent. And after World War II, although
private construction expanded vigorously, public construction expanded
even more vigorously. This situation will be discussed below.
2FACTORS INFLUENCING TIMING OF PUBLIC WORKS
A influence of War Created Needs
The possibility that public works spending be timed to offset ups and downs
in business activity can be seriously limited by the economic disturbance
caused by war. In 1947 there was a backlog of demands because construc-
tion of highways, sewers, schools, conservation and development projects
had been curtailed in 1941-46. One may recognize that an expansive pro-
gram of public works should not be pitted against private construction in
years of scarcity and inflation and still be forced to admit the postwar
urgency of certain public works. If the postwar years had happened to be
depression years, no conifict of this sort would have arisen. In fact, how-
ever, there was great confusion of counsel and the countercyclical theory
with respect to public works was buffeted by irreconcilable ideas. The
federal policy actually pursued seems to have been one of compromise:
construction of more public works than was compatible with the high pri-
vate construction but less than was compatible with known deficiencies.12
BComplementary Nature of Some Public Works
An important premise of the construction of public works as a counter-
cyclical or stabilizing device is that some can be postponed. Clearly, for
various reasons, some cannot.
Developmental projects, such as TVA or a large bridge, once started,
must usually be carried through to completion with little possibility of
acceleration or deceleration.13 The only thing that can be postponed is the
ized by Congress (A Report to Congress by the Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government, March 1949, Reorganization of the Depart-
ment of the Interior, p. 5).
121n a time of uneasy peace postponement of some typesofpublic construction may
be opposed asendangeringsecurity.
Instances to the contrary can be found. Construction of the Triborough Bridge
was halted for one and a half years, 1932-33. Construction of the Panama Canal
before 1905 and of the Queen Mary, on which work stopped for over two years,
1931-34, are instances of intermittent construction of large private projects.84 CHAPTER 4
initiation of the project. Construction to meet or alleviate a natural calamity
can be postponed even less. An area threatened by a flood must build a
levee at once. Usually, however, threats of this sort can be foreseen well
in advance, and then a choice does exist as to the timing and rate of
progress of the construction.
When public works are complementary to private they cannot long be
postponed. A private housing development in a suburb is of little value
without water and streets; highways must be constructed to accommodate
motor vehicles. If all public construction were complementary, i.e., de-
pended upon and followed private construction, countercyclical construc-
tion of public works would be impossible. But all are not and even when
some are, they need not always be timed to fit in precisely with private
construction. Streets can be left unpaved and still be usable for a while,
private sewage is feasible in new developments, and streets and facilities
for water supply can be built in advance of housing developments. Indeed,
an ideal countercycical plan might provide that part of the construction
of new streets, sewers, and water supply be done in advance of private
construction.14 In short, even though certain types of public and private
construction are complementary, public construction might lead, lag, or
be contemporaneous, depending upon cyclical conditions. Moreover, when
private construction is of a type requiring some public construction in
order to be usable, they could be planned together. Though private con-
struction in the large must be undertaken when private capitalists and
contractors decide, decisions concerning the timing of public construction
need not be subordinated to private decisions. Local governments have
long had zoning and similar restrictive laws. They might enlarge this power
to ensure that decisions concerning the relative timing of related private-
public construction be reached cooperatively; and this, in turn, might
mean that a segment of private construction would expand and contract
with public.15 A program of this sort would, to be sure, require more
advance planning at the local level and assumption of more responsibility
for timing by local officials. As will be seen below, this is a general require-
ment of the countercyclical construction of public works.
It is hard to measure the extent to which public construction is comple-
mentary to private because, for one thing, changes due to it cannot be
separated from changes due to other causes. For example, while part of
the decline in sewage disposal and water supply construction after 1931
may have been due to the decline in private construction of residential
"Public works built in depression may stimulate private construction. Thus sewage
disposal and waterworks may facilitate a pickup of residential building.
PresidentHoover in 1930-31 asked some industries to maintain their capital out-
lays. There had not, however, been cooperative planning in advance.PUBLIC WORKS, GRANTS, AND BUSINESS CYCLES 85
housing, part was due to other factors, notably the impact of depression
upon municipal finances. For another thing, one cannot say precisely what
private factors make public construction complementary. For example,
private residential construction might seem to require public construction
of streets and sewers. Yet if the houses are in a developed locality, they will
not; and even if the houses are in the outskirts, private sewage and unpaved
streets can be put up with for a time.
A factor reducing the significance of complementary public and private
construction is that most public construction consists of replacements or
improvements of existing plant.16 Segments of the plant constructed by
government over the years have to be rebuilt periodically because they have
worn out or become 'obsolete', broadly defined.'7 People in the United
States do not long tolerate an inferior public plant when better types have
been devised and built. How long can construction for purposes of replac-
ing or improving public enterprises be postponed?
C Normal Replacement of Plant
On the ground that a large capital plant must be "continuously renewed
and replaced"8 if it is to be kept in efficient operation and if replacement
'°Consumption of construction was 71.5 percent of the gross flow, 1869-1938 (Simon
Kuznets, National Product since 1869, NBER, 1946, p. 81).
17Thetotal mileage of public roads has grown less than 1 percent since 1929, although
the mileage of surfaced roads has grown two and a third times and the quality of
the surfacing some large (and immeasurable) amount. Government hospital beds
increased 40 percent 1930-40; population 7 percent. These over-all figures indicate
the importance of replacements and improvements in construction, public and private.
Thomas ii:. MacDonald, Commissioner of Public Roads, forcefully stated the criti-
cism just examined, and the related criticism concerning normal replacement of
plant, in a speech at the 32nd Annual Meeting of the American Association of State
Highway Officials, December 1946: "Government has undertaken to supply certain
services which cannot be provided with private capital. ... Amongsuch government
supplied services are sewerage, water, roads and streets, public schools and police
and fire protection. ... Theyare to a large extent interdependent or complementary.
They require certain continuing works of construction and maintenance that cannot
be turned off or turned on to accord with some theoretical concept of using such
works to fill gaps if private employment lags. ... Thetoo prevalent economic concept
of holding back highway improvements to bolster unemployment, if and when
unemployment appears, is a completely fallacious theory. It disregards the essential
principle that highway plant, like all physical properties, is constantly deteriorating.
The only sound approach is to accept the principle that to avoid irreplaceable
losses the highway plant must be continuously renewed and replaced."
Miles L. Colean has taken a very different position (Stabilizing the Construction
industry, National Planning Association Pamphlet 41, 1945, p. 15): "Actually, with
important exceptions due to sudden changes in the underlying social and industrial
structure, the amount of public works that must be initiated without any possibility
of optional timing is probably quite limited. In most cases, three to five years would
probably be the maximum time that work would need to be deferred."86 CHAPTER4
is to be economical, it is sometimes denied that some public works, notably
highways, can be postponed. Within limits this is a persuasive argument.
Under stress of World War II, when normal replacements were postponed,
some of our capital investment in roads was lost, and the poor condition
of highways put added costs upon the economy. Certainly it may be less
expensive (assuming prices of labor and equipment to remain the same)
to make replacements at a time advised by engineers. What must be exam-
ined, however, is the degree to which all these limits are flexible. If instead
of a single and closely defined point in time at which replacements must
be made unless costs are to be heavy, considerable leeway exists, public
works might be concentrated in depression. And even if replacement is
postponed or accelerated somewhat beyond the normal, some increased
costs on this account might be more than offset by general gains to the
national economy.
These criticisms appear to rest upon the concept of an economy not sub-
ject to cyclical fluctuations. In it a plant would be replaced regularly. It is
not an accident that the administrative procedure of the Bureau of Public
Roads with respect to the payment of highway grants reflects the desire of
engineers for regularizing the flow and execution of highway projects. In
the best of circumstances highways require a considerable period for plan-
fling and construction. When the complication of grants is added, and the
initiative lies with state governments held together by the cement of federal
money, the desirability of a regularized procedure is enhanced.'° Unfor-
10Abrief description of the steps followed by the Bureau of Public Roads will illus-
trate. (a) After Congressional authorization of the for any fiscal year, they
are allocated among the states according to formula. (b) The state highway depart-
ments then submit programs of projects to be constructed with these funds. After
review and approval by the federal Commissioner of Public Roads, the states take
steps preliminary to placing projects under construction. (c) Detailed plans, specifi-
cations, and estimates are next submitted for federal approval. (d) Bids are asked
and contracts awarded, subject again to federal approval. (e) Construction is started.
(f) Payments are made from state funds, federal grants being paid as a project
progresses. Since the war the lag between approval (stage c) and completed pay-
ment has been 16-20 months, but it will be shortened when materials are
plentiful and competition among contractors becomes more intense. On.e key point
in the control of expenditure is the authorizing legislation. Congressional authoriza-
tion carries contract authority and appropriations follow. Another key point is
approval of projects. Congressional or Executive indication that the rate of project
approval be accelerated or retarded would be observed by the Bureau of Public
Roads. But the Bureau tries to let the states know in advance what they can expect
and to get the federal government committed to this planned program. Modification
of either the program or the procedure in the light of business conditions is not
envisaged.PUBLIC WORKS, GRANTS, AND BUSINESS CYCLES 87
tunately the business cycle has upset the regularity engineers desire in both
replacement and administrative procedure. The economist would sacrifice
some of the planned regularities in an attempt to attain more over-all eco-
nomic stability;2° he is concerned not merely with the services rendered by
completed public works but also with the effect on employment of their
construction.
Perhaps the most impressive evidence on deferrability comes from
examining what actually happened after 1930. New public construction of
educational buildings in 1932-35 was 32 percent of 1927-30, that of
municipal highways 34 percent, and of sewage disposal and water facilities
50 percent (Table 31). A similar contraction occurred during the war:
new public construction of educational buildings in 1943-45 was 21 per-
cent of 1939-41, of municipal highways 29 percent, and of sewage disposal
and water supply 29 percent. These significant fluctuations meant that
construction had been postponed. Perhaps postponement for counter-
cyclical purposes cannot match that enforced by depression and war, but
this is a matter of political decision and is not inherent in the relationships
20J• M. Clark mentions the case "of the War Department official during the Spanish
War, who complained that he had gotten his Department working quite efficiently
when a war came along and spoiled it" (Economics of Planning Public Works,
G.P.O., 1935, p. 20).
Table 31




Building Highways Water Supply
MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
1927-30 1,498 1,876 1,208
1932-35 483 638 599
PERCENTAGES
1932-35
1927-30 32 34 50
MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
1939-41 782 598 961
1943-45 163 112 283
PERCENTAGES
1943-45
1939-41 21 29 29
Source: Construction and Construction Materials, May 1950, pp. 10-2.88 CHAPTER 4
between public and private construction.2' Furthermore, a countercycical
program would not necessarily mean greater fluctuations in public con-
struction; it would mean a different timing.
DBuilding vs. Engineering Construction
Limitations of countercyclical spending are stressed also by critics who
point out broad differences between the types of construction performed
by government and by private industry. They stress the difficulties of shift-
ing labor and capital from one to the other.22 'Engineering' works —high-
ways, sewage disposal and water facilities, conservation and development
—arepredominantly public (except railroad and hydro-power construc-
tion), while building construction is predominantly private. Because of
this concentration, expansion of engineering construction in depression,
even if it is presumed to bring some gain in total national çmployment,
would leave excess capacity and labor in a succeeding period of recovery.
A similar problem would arise with respect to contractors, governmental
organizations, and construction equipment. If contractors and govern-
mental organizations who build and plan highways have no alternative
employment, and if equipment used in constructing highways cannot eco-
nomically be turned to other purposes, expansion or contraction would be
unstabilizing to the industry. The conclusion is drawn that, with respect to
engineering construction, the proper aim is stabilization regardless of
uations in business activity.
A great deal of new construction can be postponed because old construction can
be kept in operation through maintenance and repairs. Expenditure on them is much
more stable than on new construction. Whereas the latter fell in 1933 to 24 percent
of the 1926 level, the former fell only to 66 percent. In 1926-29, when the level of
new construction was high, expenditure for maintenance and repairs was about a
third of the total expenditure for construction. Thereafter as new construction
declined, the proportion rose, being above three-quarters in 1933. Again in 1944-45
when the level of new constrllction was low, the percentage rose above 80. This
indicates that expenditure for maintenance and repairs is partly a substitute for new
construction. Miles L. Colean has suggested that, as part of a stabilization program
for the construction industry, government agencies might in depression stimulate
private expenditures for maintenance and repairs by offering easy credit facilities.
EXPENDITURE FOR MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
EXPENDITURE FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION, 1926-1949
192629 193147 193655 194135 194649
1927 31 1932 68 1937 53 1942 29 1947 45
1928 32 193378 1938 53 1943 51 1948 38
1929 37 1934 74 1939 46 1944 84 1949 35
1930 42 1935 70 1940 45 1945 87
Source: Constructionand Construction Materials, May1950, p. 5.
The distinction and the argument outlined here are expounded in memoranda pre-
pared by Robinson Newcomb, formerly on the staff of the Council of Economic
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On the other hand, planned variation in public building is desirable,
since it might offset, or partly offset, fluctuations in private building.
Building contractors can with relative ease shift their labor and capital
from construction of factories and houses to schools and other public
structures. Expansion of public building could be followed by contraction
when private building picked up.
Achievement of this limited goal —countercycicalvariation of expendi-
ture for public building and stabilization of public expenditure for engi-
neering projects —wouldbe an improvement over performance in the past.
Public building, instead of expanding, was in 1933 less than a third of the
dollar volume of 1928; public engineering, instead of remaining stable,
was in 1933 only three-quarters of the dollar volume of 1928. It appears,
however, that the sharpness of the distinctions and conclusions should be
modified.
While the broad classification of construction into building and engi-
neering is useful, a substantial portion of engineering construction is private
and of building construction is public. For the five years 1936-40, public
building construction was 20 percent of total building (excluding farm)
construction, and private engineering (public utility) construction was
22 percent of total engineering construction (Table 32). If labor and
capital can shift within the field of engineering construction, the case for
countercyclical variation of the public portion (at least to the extent of a
fifth up and down) for the purpose of improving both the stability of the
industry and the economy as a whole appears valid.
Table 32
Building and Engineering Construction, 1936-1940
1936 1937 1938 1939 19401936-40
MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
Building, total 3,039 3,603 3,461 4,501 4,825 19,429
Private* 2,278 2,960 2,754 3,466 4,010 15,468
Public 761 643 707 1,035 815 3,961
Engineering, total2,880 2,847 2,932 3,005 2,939 14,603
Private 518 705 605 683 771 3,282








Source: Construction and Construction Materials, May 1950. Public engineering
figures include highways, sewage and water, conservation and development.
*Excludingfarm building.90 CHAPTER 4
Moreover, the assumption that labor and capital can shift only within
the fields of building and engineering construction respectively —orat
least that it is hard to shift them from one to the other —maybe questioned.
While earth-moving equipment is of course very important in highway
construction and unimportant in building, some labor and equipment can
be shifted. The possibility of transferring some unemployed labor from
other industries into construction of urban highways in depression seems
promising, and expansion of this type of highway construction might be
in harmony with national needs.
The issues raised concerning the shiftability of capital, labor, and organ-
ization both within the construction industry, and to and from other
industries, cannot be resolved by theorizing. They should, however, yield
to research. And even if countercycical spending should turn out to leave
construction equipment idle in boom years, this might not be a serious
objection because much of this equipment has a short life and because
waste of a few types of specialized capital may be worth the gains. Pos-
sibly the important problem for which an answer should be sought con-
cerns the shiftability of relatively unskilled labor. If in depression such
labor can economically be employed in public construction, and if in
prosperity it can readily be shifted to private construction or to other
industries, the case for countercyclical public works spending would be
greatly strengthened because, for it, mobility of labor is far more important
than mobility of capital.
E Limited Expansibility of Public Works
Employment in the construction industry has fluctuated greatly (Table
33). During the 1930's that in private construction fluctuated most, but
Table 33
Construction Employment, 1929-1946
(average monthly number of persons, thousands)
Total PublicPrivate Total PublicPrivate
1929 2,508 511 1,997 1938 1,524 606 918
1930 2,102 615 1,487 1939 1,909 728 1,181
1931. 1,759 639 1,1.20 1.940 1,91.6 596 1,320
1932 1,165 568 1941 2,446 1,023 1,423
1933 976 524 452 1942 2,214 1,488 726
1934 1,151 613 538 1943 1,338 957 381
1935 1,292 612 680 1944 762 387 375
1936 1,763 843 920 1945 967 282 685
1937 1,778 724 1,054 1946 1,853 341 1,512
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 786, The Construction Industry in the
United States, p. 7. Workers engaged in new construction and major additions, altera-
tions and repairs are included; those engaged on maintenance are excluded. The
series of Bulletin 786 stops in 1943, but the Monthly Labor Review, August 1947,
p. 202, presents figures on employment, 1941-46, that are Identical for the overlap-
ping years 1941-43, and presumably since.PUBLIC WORKS, GRANTS, AND BUSINESS CYCLES 91
after 1940 construction due to the war brought a large inflow of workers
and after 1942 there was a large exodus.
In a prosperous peacetime year, workers engaged in new construction
might total 2,100,000. If an effort were made to hold back public con-
struction in such a year, possibly 420,000 workers, 20 percent, might be
in public construction and 1,680,000 in private. In the event of a depres-
sion that halved the workers in the latter, the number in the former would
have to expand nearly threefold in order to make up for this decline.
Is such an expansion feasible? Under pressure of war demands, employ-
ment in the public sector more than quintupled in two and a half years
from February 1940 to August 1942.23 On-site employment on PWA
nonfederal and federal aid highways expanded from 75,000 in 1932 to
124,000 in 1933 and to 273,000 in 193424 —266percent in two years.
Perhaps it is not over-optimistic to assume, supposing legislative authoriza-
tion and finance have already been voted, that workers in public construc-
tion might increase threefold in a year and a half, thereby bringing
employment in the construction industry back to the level of the prosperous
year. If, however, employment in public construction were simply main-
tained, the industry as a whole would have 842,500 persons unemployed.
FPeriod Required for Planning and Construction
Public works take time to plan and construct. Planning includes "architec-
tural, engineering, and economic investigations and studies, surveys, de-
signs, plans, working drawings, specifications, procedures, and other action
preliminary to the construction of public works".25 The United States
Public Work Reserve found that the time required for plans and surveys of
"a large sample drawn from 7,000 capital improvement projects" of
states and localities averaged 2.39 months.26 The National Resources
Planning Board found that, for nonfederal PWA projects in the 1938
program, 90 percent of the contracts had been awarded within 100 days
EMPLOYMENT IN PUBLIC CONSTRUCTION
Feb. 1940 April 1941 Aug. 1942 Dec. 1943
386,000 941,000 1,950,000 521,000
RE LA T IV ES
100 244 505 135
100 208 55
BLS Bulletin 786, p. 7.
100 27
Gaibraith and Johnson, op. cit., p. 40. Miles L. Colean, in illustrating his scheme
for stabilizing the construction industry, assumes that a threefold expansion of new
public construction could take place in the first year of depression and a sevenfold
by the fourth year (Stabilizing the Construction Industry, p. 38).
definition, given in Public Law 352 (81st Cong., 1st Sess.), is approximately
that of title V of the War Mobilization and Reconversion Act of 1944.
26 wasthe median; the mode was 1.61. Higgins, International Labor Review,
November 1944, p. 595.92 CHAPTER 4
from the date of the allotment of the money.27 Moreover, the kind of con-
struction had little effect upon the interval and the size of the projects
did not have a very noticeable effect, although larger projects (costing
more than $100,000) required somewhat more time to plan.
As will be argued more fully below, a good deal of this preconstruction
work can be done well in advance. A shelf of projects can be prepared so
that the delay in putting men to work on the site after the decision is taken
to construct a project will not be long. Expert opinion holds that the
danger of obsolescence in the plans is slight. "If the projects are selected
intelligently and represent a continuing need, and if the plans are made
by competent technicians and checked after the preliminary stage, there is
no reason to anticipate any substantial loss through obsolescence, varia-
tions in taste, new inventions, or higher standards."28 Advance planning
also enables localities to finance public works at lower cost because com-
plete and thorough consideration of blueprints and specifications, with the
benefit of federal criticism and suggestions, should eliminate the need for
changes while the project is being built. It should, moreover, enable locali-
ties to get lower bids from contractors or lower rates from lenders who will
finance the projects. The significant advantage, however, for purposes of
this study is that advance planning cuts the time necessary to get on-site
construction started.
How long does it take to construct public works after the contract has
been let, assuming the site has already been acquired? There are two
phases: the engineering planning phase, i.e., preparation of working draw-
ings and specifications, and the construction phase. The National Re-
sources Planning Board found that, for nonfederal construction, the former
averaged 48 days and that the most important factor was "the time of the
year when contracts are awarded". 29Forawards in the winter, November
to February inclusive, nearly twice as many days elapse before construction
starts as for awards in other months. This interval between contract award
in winter and the start of construction was much more important for
highways than for other types of project. The seasonal delay cannot be
reduced by advance planning, but delay due to preparation of working
drawings and specifications can.
The length of the construction period depends more upon the size th.an
the type of project. Small projects, $10,000-50,000,take on the average
10 to 30 weeks; water facilities, sewers, and streets take less time than
buildings and bridges. Large projects, $500,000-1,000,000 take on the
Gaibraith and Johnson, op. cit., p. 78.
29TaskForce Report on Public Works, Appendix Q,p.7.
Gaibraith and Johnson, op. cit., p. 84.PUBLIC WORKS, GRANTS, AND BUSINESS CYCLES 93
average 57 to 89 weeks and the differences in average time according to
type of project are relatively narrow (Table 34). This indicates that a shelf
should include projects of different size, but that a variety of types is not
necessary to assure flexibility in terms of the average period. In 1942 state
and local projects took 5-7 months to construct on the average (Table
36)As would be expected, smaller projects reach peak employment
quickly. Those costing up to $50,000 reach a peak in the second month
and those costing $50,000-99,999 in the fourth month. The more costly
the project, the later and less marked the peak.3' Table 35 gives similar
information about low rent housing projects.
The administrative, political, and legal mechanism involved in getting
public money also takes time. The controls governing the appropriation of
public funds are complex and few could be eased except by altering the
procedure. Congressional authorization and appropriation is time consum-
ing, and construction appropriations, federal and nonfederal, are not now
gathered in one bill. They could, however, be combined and Congress
could, if it chose, give legislative priority to this bill. Or Congress could
Higgins, Public Investment and Full Employment (Montreal, 1946), pp. 140-1.
The mode was 4.92 months, the median 6.90 months.
Gaibraith and Johnson, op. cit., pp. 97-8.
Table 34
Average Number of Weeks Required to Complete Various Types of Nonfederal
Projects of Different Size
COST OF PROJECT(thousandsofdollars)
10-25-50-75-100-250-500-750-
24.949.974.999.9 249.9 499.9 749.9 999.9
Water mains 10.816.021.628.033.443.658.067.3
Storm & combined sewers 12.716.222.829.239.748.457.869.0
Water storage 13.022.027.428.630.446.357.669.4















Source: Gaibraith and Johnson, op. cit., p. 89. Based on an analysis of the construc-
tion of 7,893 nonfederal PWA projects completed in 1934-39. Elapsed time is mea-
sured from the date construction starts to the date when all work is in place.94 CHAPTER 4
Table 35
AverageDelay in Months for Low Rent Public Housing Projects
From Contract
Size by Award to Final
Type of Developmental Completion







Source: Sherman J. Maisel, Timing and Flexibility of a Public Works Program,
Review of Economics and Statistics. May 1949, p. 149.
provide a continuing appropriationadvance appropriations to be spent
under specified conditions or at the discretion of the Executive. Some flexi-
bility could be assured by voting part of the appropriation as a lump sum
to be allocated by the Executive. Precisely what measures are desirable to
ease the problem of legislative inflexibility calls for a political rather than
an economic judgment, but it is certain that existing procedures are for-
midable obstacles to quick action.
Legislative and legal hurdles to state and local appropriations are even
more serious. The appropriation process in itself is not ordinarily very time
consuming at the local level, but may be at the state because of the infre-
quency and limited duration of legislative sessions. More important are the
legal and constitutional restrictions on borrowing. In terms of countercycli-
cal construction of public works they are a serious obstacle.
Table 36
Estimated Duration of Capital Improvements Projects Submitted to the U.S.
Public Work Reserve, Percentage Distribution
Plans Total
Construction and Surveys Time Required
Less than 2 weeks 0.3 26.3 0.2
1- 4 months 42.2 66.5 29.4
5- 8 months 26.9 5.0 31.5
9-12 months 18.3 1.8 15.0
13-16 months 1.7 .. 10.8
1.7-20 months 1.8 0.2 2.6
2 1-24 months 4.6 0.2 1.8
25-28 months 0.4 .. 2.7
29-32 months 0.4 .. 1.8
33-36 months 1.0 .. 1.0
37-40 months .. .. 0.5
4 1-44 months .. .. 0.2
45-48 months 0.3 .. 0.5
More than4years 2.1 .. 2.5
100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Higgins, Public investment and Full Employment, p. 141.PUBLIC WORKS, GRANTS, AND BUSINESS CYCLES 95
3COUNTERCYCLICAL SPENDING AFTER 1930
Each criticism so far examined has some validity and serves to emphasize
practical impediments to countercycical spending for public works. The
experience of the 193 0's is examined in an attempt to discover the manifest
defects of public works spending.
Part of the explanation is that the theory was not understood. Herbert
Hoover, when Secretary of Commerce, had endorsed cyclical planning of
public works and in 1930 the federal government expanded its own pro-
gram and encouraged state and local governments to follow its example
although without offering them financial assistance. But this effort soon
bogged down. President Hoover and his advisers, as well as many influen-
tial members of the Democratic Party, became convinced that the biggest
obstacle to recovery was an unbalanced federal budget.32 A corollary was
that any expansion of public works should be accompanied by higher
federal taxes; and since higher taxes would tend to diminish employment in
private industry, a spending policy was not launched. Yet the logic of the
expansion of public works spending in depression is that it should be
financed by creating debt rather than by taxing. After 1933, of course, it
was. But other and more practical difficulties soon became apparent.
It is not easy to get thousands of governments to cooperate about any-
thing. Cooperation in construction is peculiarly difficult because it is
carried on by many governments, often small, in response to diverse needs,
and because projects require time to prepare and execute. To handle this
complicated task there was, in 1933, almost a complete lack of adminis-
trative preparation. More specifically, four deficiencies are discernible: no
effective organization existed at the federal level; no organization existed
at the state-local level; little advance planning had been done; projects had
not been classified by deferrability.33
The Democratic platform of 1932 declared for "maintenance of the national credit
by a Federal budget annually balanced". Senator Carter Glass, perhaps the most
influential spokesman of the Party on financial questions during the presidential
campaign of 1932, attacked the Hoover for an unbalanced budget.
In the middle of 1932 President Hoover said (Congressional Record, Vol. 75,
p. 10959): "It is generally agreed that the balancing of the Federal Budget and
unimpaired national credit is indispensable to the restoration of confidence and to
the very start of economic recovery. ... Apublic works program ... throughthe
issuance of federal bonds, creates at once an enormous further deficit."
This summary statement rests on the conclusion that the efforts at organization by
the Employment Committee (1930), the Federal Employment Stabilization Board
(1931), the President's Organization for Unemployment Relief (1931) accomplished
little; see, e.g., Higgins, Public Investment and Full Employment, p. 149; Williams,
Grants-in-Aid under the Public Works Administration, pp. 12-22, 163.96 CHAPTER 4
A Relief and Work Relief: FERA and WPA
The argument over federal responsibility for action concerning unemploy-
ment and relief was resolved in spring 1933 when a new administration
took office. Congress soon assumed a larger but undefined responsibility
for direct relief, work relief, and public works.
The Federal Emergency Relief Administration, set up in May 1933,
was designed to cope with the problem of relief. It operated as a grant
system, but the great difference between it and any other grants was the
wide discretionary power given the federal administrator. Funds made
available to FERA in 1933-37 totaled $3,100 million with no specific and
formal requirement for state-local contributions because Congress did not
know either the extent of the need or the fiscal abilities of the states.34 The
federal administrator, in addition to his great power in allocating grants
and determining the amount of the state-local contribution, had wide
powers of supervision which he exercised vigorously. Among other things
he tried to push state-local governments away from direct relief and
toward work relief. This raised a major difficulty because in the spring of
1933 most states and localities favored direct relief. Work relief put a
heavier burden upon their depleted treasuries, required discovery and
appraisal of suitable projects, and raised serious questions of administra-
tion and supervision.
As a result, a feeling grew up at Washington in favor of a program of
work relief that would be completely federal. The Civil Works Adminis-
tration, set up in November 1933, was the outcome. In the fiscal year 1934
it spent $987,000,000 for work relief, of which 91 percent was federal
money.
The administrator, meanwhile, had trouble in developing a sound grant
technique for FERA. Friction arose over standards of relief, supervision,
appointments, and the state-local share of expenditure. Because of state-
local pressures the federal share rose from 60.6 percent in 1933 to 74.4
percent in 1935; the state shares ranged from 35 to over 95 percent. As
time passed, the discretionary power given the administrator tended to
undermine the administration of relief (see Ch. 3).
The President announced a new federal program on January 4, 1935.
The appropriation of $500 million in the original act of May 1933 was split into
two equal parts, one to be distributed at the discretion of the administrator and the
other so that each state would receive $1 as a grant for every $3 of state-local money
spent for relief. After October 1, 1933, however, any unexpended balance of the
latter could be shifted over to the discretionary basis, and this in fact was done. Sub-
sequent appropriations put grants on a discretionary basis, but the administrator
always attempted to require that state and local governments contribute according
to their financial ability.PUBLtC WORKS, GRANTS, AND BUSINESS CYCLES 97
A rough line was to be drawn between employables and unemployables, the
latter becoming a state-local responsibility, except that certain categories
were to be aided by federal grants. To care for employables a new federal
agency, the Works Progress Administration, was to be created. It was to
provide work relief, not through grants, but as a federal scheme modeled
upon the earlier CWA. However, although WPA expenditure for nonfed-
eral purposes was through federal, not through state-local officers, it was
much closer to grants than to federal expenditure for ordinary federal
purposes. Sponsorship of projects to WPA was by state and local govern-
ments, much as projects were recommended to the Bureau of Public Roads
for grants; responsibility for the supervision of the construction of accepted
projects was placed largely upon the sponsors; the sponsors put up part
of the expenditure —until1939 an amount dependent on the discretion
of the administrator and thereafter at least 25percenton the average;
finally, WPA expenditure on nonfederal projects relieved state-local
budgets.
WPA projects were diverse in type, but construction expenditure pre-
dominated —itwas over three-quarters of the total —withexpenditure for
highways, roads, and streets constituting half.
An important aspect of WPA for present purposes is the division of
costs of projects between the sponsor and the federal government. As it
turned out, actual sponsor contributions varied widely, and some well-
to-do governmental units were more successful at evading their financial
responsibilities than were the poorer Congress became convinced
that the root of the matter was the broad discretionary power given to the
administrator and in 1939 stipulated that not less than 25 percent of the
total cost of nonfederal projects approved to be undertaken in any state
was to be borne by the sponsors.
BPWA
The Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works was set up in
June 1933 to promote nonfederal construction by grants and loans, the
grants until 1935 being approximately 20-25 percent of the total cost of a
project, and 45 percent thereafter.3° It was authorized to deal with local
as well as state governments. Perhaps three-quarters of the public works
that might be stimulated by federal grants (and loans) were the responsi-
Evidence for this statement is summarized in J. A. Maxwell, The Fiscal Impact of
Federalism in the United States (Harvard University Press, 1946), Pp. 153-8. For
example, of the 24 states in which the largest WPA expenditure (excluding sponsor
contributions) per capita was made through June 30, 1940, 8 were below and 16 were
above the median in per capita income, 1938-40.
PWA spent also for federal construction, but this will not be considered here.98 CHAPTER 4
bility of local governments, and few states had a single department con-
nected with or informed about these works. To operate only through state
governments would have meant delay or even complete inaction. Since
PWA was to operate on the basis of projects, no formula in the law specified
the total allotment for any state. PWA itself gave some attention to geo-
distribution, but in genera]. argued that expenditures by states
reflected only 'direct' benefits. No matter where the actual expenditures
were made, advantages accrued to the nation not to be measured in geo-
graphical terms, especially since PWA was not a work relief agency.
A significant aspect of the experience of PWA was the delay in getting
the nonfederal program started. Although PWA in 1933 had an appropria-
tion of $3,300 million, eighteen months passed before 100,000 people were
work on the site.37 Few plans and specifications had been prepared in
advance, and the administrator, Harold Ickes, who wished to avoid pork-
barrel expenditure, set up a highly centralized procedure and administra-
tion to screen projects and make decisions. Greater speed was gradually
achieved, but up to June 30, 1941 total nonfederal construction expendi-
ture was only $4,144,200,000 —nearly$1,750 million less than the com-
parable expenditure of WPA.
The difficulty experienced by PWA in getting the information it desired
concerning projects focused attention upon and gave explicit content to
the idea of advance planning. Many states and localities not only did not
have, but did not know how to prepare, important information concerning
the legal, engineering, and financial aspects of a project, sometimes because
their engineering forces had been reduced in the depression, but often
because of sheer inability. In the early months of PWA fewer than half of
the nonfederal projects sent through the clearing house of state engineers
to Washington were finally approved.38
It must not be thought, however, that lack of advance preparation was
the sole reason expenditure on public works did not expand. Before PWA
a few local governments had plans for public works which collapsed after
1930 for financial reasons.3° And constitutional and statutory limitations
Testimony of Major-General Philip B. Fleming, 78th Congress, 2d Session, House
Hearings before the Committee on Roads, Federal Aid for Post-war Highway Con-
struction, Vol. 2, P. 933. "We had nothing prepared then but dreams and idle fancies,
and it was 18 months before we had 100,000 people at work on the site. That was
because there were no plans or specifications ready. ... Wehad to create CWA and
WPA which followed it. I think if we had plans and specifications we would never
have gone through the days of CWA and WPA. ..." Itshould be remembered that
this comment refers to the nonfederal program of PWA.
Gayer, op. cit., p. 114.
Detroitis one notable example; ibid., pp. 170-4.PUBLIC WORKS, GRANTS, AND BUSINESS CYCLES 99
upon state-local borrowing sometimes prevented PWA from overcoming
financial obstacles. PWA made loans at the flat rate of 4 percent on the
basis of 'reasonable' or 'acceptable' security, but found few borrowers
until state and local governments extended their borrowing power through
use of revenue bonds, secured by the revenue from the project they helped
to create. Since such a bond does not put a burden upon ordinary govern-
mental revenues, it has been held to be outside debt limitations. Encour-
aged by PWA, authorities issuing revenue bonds multiplied rapidly and
so did the type of project financed by them. Besides toll bridges and utili-
ties, there were golf courses, swimming pools, dormitories, etc., which
were self-supporting because 45percentof their cost was covered by an
outright federal grant, leaving only the remainder, or part of it, to be
covered by a loan. To a large extent, PWA sold, chiefly to the RFC, the
bonds purchased originally by it, and emerged from its ventures with very
small losses.
In brief, while federal grants for construction are now confined to a small
part of the total field, precedent is abundant for expansion and offers some
guidance concerning what might and might not be done in the future.
1) If in a future depression the federal government is impelled to expand
its expenditure for nonfederal construction, and if events allow it to
choose, informed opinion seems to favor public works over work relief.4°
In terms of damping cyclical fluctuations, public works are preferable
because Congress cannot be expected to tolerate a work relief scheme
during prosperity.4'
2) The experience of PWA is, therefore, important. Preeminent in this
experience is the lesson that no scheme for countercyclical expenditure on
public works has a chance of success unless state and local officers are
carefully trained in advance. Desirable projects are sometimes not eligible
for federal money because not enough is known about them. A reservoir
Inwork relief workers are taken from relief rolls and in the selection of projects
preference is given to those which permit a large use of labor organized on force
account rather than on contract work. An emphatic opinion in favor of public works
is expressed in the Task Force Report on Public Works (p. 5), and similar expres-
sions by Congressional leaders and federal officials could be cited. Yet depression
might well change opinion as the relative cheapness in terms of governmental expen-
diture of work relief compared with public works was realized.
Recovery brings special difficulties for a work relief program. The task of providing
projects that fit the skills of the unemployed is aggravated because the best workers
move to private employment and because the total unemployed shrinks. Yet curtail-
ment of the program is not easy because the need of those remaining on the payroll
is obvious.100 CHAPTER 4
of state-local projects of tested value is unlikely to be created and main-
tained without continuous federal leadership.
3) Advance planning by itself, however, is only an essential preliminary
to the vital problem of finance. When confronted by severe depression
state-local governments as a whole have not had and cannot be expected
to develop the fiscal ability to expand countercydical spending. The few
that are strong enough tend to hold back because expansion or contraction
by them can affect the level of income and employment within their own
area to only a limited degree. Financial assistance from the federal govern-
ment by grants and loans has been suggested as a technique for getting
concerted action by all levels of governments.
4) Financial assistance is made more necessary, yet more difficult to
render, by the thicket of constitutional and statutory limitations surround-
ing state-local ability to spend and to borrow. Their removal is bound
to be a slow process which cannot be accomplished after depression strikes.
5) Within states consolidation of the control of public construction by
state governments, and centralization of state controls over that of local
governments, would allow federal grants and loans for construction to be
allocated through state organizations. But again this process, if accom-
plished at all, can go forward only slowly. For the present some federal-
local contacts seem inevitable in a countercycical scheme.
4PossIBLE MoDIFIcATIoNs
A Centralization of Federal Construction
Looking to the future, some students think that the initiative in framing
a public works program for all levels of government must come from the
federal government :42italone can take an over-all view, it alone has the
financial resources, and it alone, not any level of government, is
responsible for trying to moderate cyclical swings. As a first step coordina-
tion of its own public works activities has been suggested. The Calmer
Committee believed that "to keep its own house in order, the Federal
Government should clear the actual commencement of approved Federal
projects through a public-works authority concerned with national policy.
Each Federal agency which has appropriations for construction should,
before actually undertaking construction, have the program cleared as to
The Task Force Report on Public Works stated that "the advance planning
promotion of public works ... shouldbe recognized as a continued responsibility
of the Federal Government, working in cooperation with States and municipalities"
(p. 4). Gayer, writing in 1935, said (op. cit., p. 357): "If the adoption of the principle
of planned elastic construction expenditures were deemed desirable, the problem
would thus become one, first of the Federal government taking the initiative, and
next of encouraging or inducing local governments to follow its example."PUBLIC WORKS, GRANTS, AND BUSINESS CYCLES 101
its timeliness. The clearance should be not only on the basis of the value
of the project but also with due regard to the state of employment in the
construction industry and the state of the business cycle."43 Upon such a
federal authority would fall the task of seeing that public works were
planned in advance, classified according to deferrability, and accelerated
or decelerated according to cyclical conditions. The operative obstacles,
especially to postponing federal construction in prosperity, are serious.
Federal officers directly interested in federal projects have always felt that
their primary duty is to push toward initiation and completion as rapidly
as possible. Political pressure operates in exactly the same direction (see
note 11). Against pressures of this type the sole defense is the general
interest of the nation in a countercyclical program.
Since federal construction in 1948 was less than a third of total new
public construction, its centralization would not directly affect the other
two-thirds which are, and may be expected to remain, a responsibility of
state and local governments because they know state-local needs and are
in a position to exercise effective administration. But recent history indi-
cates that their ability in severe depression to carry the financial responsi-
bility is questionable.44 The two-thirds cut in their expenditure in the three
years after 1930 contributed to deflation in the nation and acute dis-
turbance in the industry. And the reason was primarily fiscal. If federal
intervention could induce state-local governments to postpone expenditure
when private construction is active and to bring it forward in the opposite
situation, the construction industry might be stabilized and a contribution
made toward general economic stability.
In terms of both precedent and promise the grant-in-aid will appear to
many people to be an acceptable and effective lever to enlarge federal
cyclical control over state-local expenditure for construction.45 Such
79thCongress, 1st Session, House Report 852, Postwar Public Works and Con-
struction, p. 34. In this quotation clearance of both a program and projects is
suggested. One may doubt that the latter clearance is desirable. Experts in the several
fields should be better judges of projects than a central agency. The central agency
might find it wise to avoid making specialized and technical judgments for the
operating agencies.
""There is not," according to the Task Force Report on Public Works, "a State, city,
or municipal subdivision in the country which can, on its own, finance a depression-
construction program sufficient to make a real dent in the employment problem.
Federal assistance is required" (p. 6).
Amore abstract justification of such grants would, as in the case of welfare grants,
run in terms of a national minimum. If state-local governments could at all times
establish and maintain a level of highways, etc. adequate to meet national require-
ments, federal grants would be unnecessary. But if, because of depression, or because
even in good years what they budget is inadequate, the federal government might be
prepared to allocate enough money so that this, when added to state-local expendi-
tures, would provide an acceptable national minimum.102 CHAPTER4
grants might be of two types: grants for planning and grants for state-local
construction projects of every type that have been planned and cleared
in advance.4°
B Grants for Planning
Until plans and specifications have been worked out, contracts prepared,
and bids asked, the mere availability of an appropriation will not put men
to work on a project. The wisdom of advance preparation of a shelf or
reserve of projects led Congress by Title V of the War Mobilization and
Reconstruction Act of 1944 to authorize $65 million to be allocated as
advances among state and local governments for planning public works.
The advances were to be repayable without interest whenever construction
was undertaken. The authority to make advances ended on June 30, 1947
and Congress did not extend or enlarge it. By this date approval had been
given for the preparation of plans for 7,338 projects, which, if constructed,
were estimated to cost $2,400 million. Planning had been completed on
5,827 of these projects. By June 30, 1949, 1,540 projects, chiefly for
sewage, water, and sanitation, had been placed under construction, thereby
reducing the value of the shelf $400 million.47
In October 1949 a new and similar measure was enacted. Repayable
advances not to exceed $100 million for a two year period were authorized.
These were to be allocated among the states, 75 percent according to popu-
lation and 25 percent according to need as determined by the Adminis-
trator of General Services. It was estimated that this would enable $3 billion
of new state and local public works to be planned.48 The new measure was
aimed less than its predecessor at building up a shelf of projects that might
be started in the event of depression because of a provision that, if con-
struction of a project is "not undertaken or started within three years after
'°J.M. Clark in his Economics of Planning Public Works (p. 122) declared that a
coordinated scheme of public works justified the federal government "in making
subsidies not only to the actual carrying out of the projects but to the advance work
of planning and preparation to whatever extent may be necessary in order to induce
the states and localities to make their advance planning really effective".
See81st Congress, 1st Session, House Hearings before the Com,nittee on Public
Works on HR 5739, Advance Planning of Public Works (Washington, 1949), pp.
12-61.
48ofMay 31, 1950 advances of $8.5 million had been approved, covering 483
projects estimated to cost $286 million. Over two-thirds of the approvals were of
sewer facilities, and school and other educational buildings. Applications under
review, but not approved, covered 897 projects estimated to cost $876 million. The
war in Korea caused the measure to be converted toward planning of defense-related
projects and convinced the Executive that further extension of the program should
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the full amount of the loan or advance theref or has been made", the
Administrator shall investigate the situation and may demand repayment
of the loan (Public Law 352, Sec. 2). As a result the projects planned
tended to be those for immediate construction. The concept of a shelf was
pushed into the background. The justification of the three year limitation
was that a shelf may become obsolete and money spent on plans may,
therefore, be lost. Against this loss, however, one should set the gain that
comes from preparation for accelerated construction of public works in
depression.
The brief experience with advance planning under Title V offers a few
conclusions. Most small governmental units, roughly those with popula-
tions under 50,000, do not even have plans in the design stage because
they lack authority, money, and staff with technical ability. A surprising
number of large units are in little better position. Without strong federal
stimulus it seems unlikely that state and local governments will plan ahead
adequately. The Task Force Report on Public Works of the Hoover Com-
mission declared (pp. 5-6): "Few States and municipalities are geared to
turn out detailed postwar public works plans and specifications within any
reasonable time, even assuming they know what they want to do and have
public as well as official opinion back of their program. With a few notable
exceptions they lack sufficient regular engineering design forces."
If the federal government is to stimulate and coordinate efforts toward
advance planning, a more generous and continuous program may be
required. Since the emphasis of such a program would lie not simply in
encouraging planning but in planning deferrable projects, outright grants
might be offered to cover part (perhaps half) of the planning cost of
approved projects so classified, while repayable advances might be offered
for other acceptable projects.49 A debatable issue is how far the federal
government should deal directly with local governments. The Colmer Com-
mittee preferred federal-state arrangements and, as a long run scheme, this
has the advantage of decentralizing public works planning so that the
federal government would have to deal with only 48 governments instead
of with thousands of local governments.50 Unfortunately, some states are
bound to be slow in setting up a system that would adequately reach their
local governments, and in such cases the Task Force on Public Works of
the Hoover Commission has suggested direct federal-local contact as an
Thebasis of allocation of Public Law 352 is state population for 75 percent and
administrative discretion for 25 percent of the total. A limit might be set on the
allowable planning cost of a project, probably as a percentage of total estimated cost.
The Bureau of Public Roads has allowed 1½ percent for planning.
PostwarPublic Works and Construction, p. 35.104 CHAPTER 4'
alternative.5' The latter seems to have special merit for metropolitan
centers.
CConstruction Grants
Success in extensive advance planning and selection of deferrable projects
would, of course, not necessarily induce state-local governments to enlarge
and accelerate their public works spending with recession and to curtail
and retard it with prosperity. For those purposes a federal grant program
covering the whole area of state-local construction may be necessary.
According to one approach, administration of such a program as well as
of direct federal construction would be centralized in a Public Works
Agency. Another approach would leave administrative responsibility in
the appropriate functional federal department. In the latter case, however,
decisions concerning the timing of both direct federal construction and the
grant programs would be centralized in a board of review (see Sec. 4E). In
both cases the aim would be so to direct the volume of public construction
as to compensate for fluctuations in private construction. And in further-
ance of this aim projects competing with or replacing private construc-
tion would be avoided as inimical to success. A shelf or reserve of fully
planned projects, classified by deferrability, would be built up and the
Executive would be given a large authorization for expenditure and ade-
quate appropriations.
Both the total amount and the percentage of the cost of projects offered
as grants to state-local governments might be varied yearly. Let us suppose
Congress told the administrator of the agency, or the board of review, to
use the level of private construction as the chief guide to policy decisions
concerning grants. When the level was high, the percentage of the cost of
approved state-local projects assumed as grants should be low; when the
level was low, grants would be larger. The administrator, or board, either
by authority or by Congressional instruction, might specify that for the year
ahead, expected to be a year of high employment, the level of new private
construction would be $16 billion and the appropriate rate for federal
grants be 10 percent. Unless this yearly rate of private construction fell off
more than $3 billion, 18 percent, the 10 percent would be held. If the
yearly rate of private construction declined below $13 biffion, grants
would be at the rate of 50 percent, and if below $10.5 billion at the rate of
60 percent. The range in percentages, from 10 to 60, is wide because of
61The history of the Bureau of Public Roads demonstrates how an efficient federal-
state system of administrative relationships can be set up. This has, however, evolved
during thirty-odd years from small beginnings. A favorable appraisal is given in
The Report of the Committee on Federal Grants-in-Aid of the Council of State
Governments, Federal Grants-in-Aid (1949), pp. 229-3 1, 238.PUBLIC WORKS, GRANTS, AND BUSINESS CYCLES 105
Levelof Private Construction Rate of Federal Grant
(billions of dollars) (percent)
Above 13.0 10
10.5 and under 13.0 50
Under 10.5 60
the assumption that the federal government should be generous in depres-
sion and niggardly in prosperity.52
The level of private construction might be allowed to fall 18-20 percent
before specifying any increase in grant, and therefore in spending for
public works, on the premise that such spending should not be responsive
to mild downturns in private construction. In the first place, a mild down-
turn may reverse itself within a short period. Prompt acceleration of spend-
ing would in this case not serve a countercyclical purpose and might be
inflationary. In the second place, construction costs are rigid against de-
cline. Prompt acceleration of public construction, following a mild decline
in private, would reduce the pressure toward a fall in costs.53
It is, of course, possible that delay in accelerating public works might
not avert bad timing, since an upturn in private construction might still
coincide with the acceleration. But delay until the decline in private con-
struction had been appreciable would reduce the possibility of this even-
tuality, and even if private construction did revive, the ground to be made
up because of the delay might be sufficient so that the inflationary effect
would be unimportant. The difficulty of bad timing could, moreover, be
minimized by concentrating on small projects at the start. If private con-
struction continued to drop, the public authorities could push large proj-
ects of long duration with more confidence. But if private construction
recovered, construction of small public projects would soon cease.
Once a decision to accelerate public works has been taken, it should
promptly be made effective. This is the purpose of advance planning. The
same purpose is served by delaying acceleration until after an appreciable
fall in private construction. A lag in initiation should give time to round
A small number of brackets might serve to reduce administrative complexity, and,
since each class has a wide interval, state-local governments might be less tempted
to delay or accelerate in the belief that a bracket might be broken through. Another
administrative device might be to regard a break-through as established only if
maintained.
Gayer (op. cit.,p.381), quoting S. H. Slichter, has suggested that a public works
program be utilized by government to reduce construction costs: "The government
might predicate its willingness to expand construction by a given amount upon the
willingness of building labor and producers of building materials to accept a given
reduction in the prices. In that event, the public works program would be doubly
useful —itwould directly tend to increase the volume of spending and it would
accelerate price changes that are needed in order for a change and growth on a large
scale to become profitable."106 CHAPTER 4
out plans for action —inbrief, to conclude all preliminary moves short of
letting contracts.
Let us return to the example given above and work out the possible
effects upon the level of total construction. Assumptions must be made
about the levels of federal and state-local construction at the start, and of
their responsiveness to a policy of acceleration. Suppose the level of new
public construction in a year of high employment to be $4 billion, of which
30 percent is federal and 70 percent nonfederal. The prospect for increase
with depression would, of course, be improved as far as public construction
had been retarded in prosperity. Let us assume that when private construc-
tion fell below $13 billion, public construction, both federal and non-
federal, could be doubled in a year and a half, and that when private
construction fell below $10.5 billion, public construction could be in-
creased threefold in two years.54 The total spent as grants would grow
from $280 million to $2,800 and $5,040 million; the level of total con-
struction would move from $20,000 to $20,900 and $22,400 million
(Table 37).
How could existing grant programs, notably that for highways with a
federal share of 50 percent, be fitted into the scheme? If, at some future
time, the program of aid for highways was being enlarged, an opportunity
for merger into a variable grant plan would be presented. Otherwise inte-
gration that entailed loss of a 50 percent grant would encounter opposition.
Indeed, officials connected with existing programs cannot be expected to
favor a plan that would, in good years, reduce their grants to 10 percent.
A modification, altering the status quo less, would convert the plan into
one for emergencies. In bad years grants on a liberal basis might be offered
for construction not now receiving aid, and supplementary grants might
be offered for existing programs. Logically this plan would, when economic
conditions improved, call for discontinuing the former and reverting to
Theseassumptions seem not to be extreme. Miles Colean assumed a threefold
expansion of new public construction to be possible in one year (op. cit., p. 38).
During 1933-36 federal expenditure for construction, including work relief, grew
relatively as follows (Gaibraith and Johnson, op. cit., p. 18):
1933 1934 1935 1936
Current dollars 100 213 196 360
Constant dollars 100 195 188 336
Federal construction 1940-42 grew nearly eightfold, but much of it was for industrial
plants which, except in wartime, are a private responsibility. State-local construction
showed a high downward flexibility 193 1-33, as already indicated. Since 1945 it has
grown relatively as follows:
.1945 .1946 1947 1948
Current dollars 100 208 367 538













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the latter. The defects of such an emergency scheme are that the complete
obliteration of working administrative contacts in good years would place
impediments in the way of quick action in emergencies, and that maximum
countercyclical leverage requires complete rather than partial coverage of
state and local construction.55
D Geographical Allocation of Grants
Grants fluctuate cyclically, but at any point of time the federal percentage
is uniform for all states. The justification is the developmental nature of
construction expenditure: in contrast to welfare expenditure which affects
directly only the level of consumption, its purpose is to improve produc-
tivity and employment. Construction expenditure, because a large part
goes for the purchase of equipment and materials, may also be less localized
in its effects than welfare expenditure. A good deal of public construction,
furthermore, is for revenue-producing purposes —constructionof facilities
for water supply and sewage disposal, conservation and development, pub-
lic service enterprises, and even highways and bridges. Considerations of
this sort weigh against varying the federal share so as to favor the poorer
states. In allocating total grants, however, account might be taken of
differences in state needs. For example, a state with a large area and small
population needs more rural highway mileage per capita and requires
larger highway expenditures per capita than one in the opposite situa-
a state with a large urban population has more need for sewage
disposal facilities than one with a large rural population. Precise measures
of need are not necessary, and reliance on such criteria as total population,
urban population, and area would serve for most purposes.
E Location of Authority
Where is authority to decide on the federal percentage and the total amount
of the grant for each year to be vested? It is arguable that the predominant
responsibility should be federal because the cyclical outlook of state-local
governments is likely to be colored by the abundance or deficiency of their
current resources and the pressures behind their projects. In Australia,
another federal country, an intergovernmental mechanism, the National
Works Council which advises the Loan Council, for making annual deci-
A late start in providing grants would increase the danger of bad timing because
once projects had become eligible for higher percentage grants, the higher percentage
should usually hold until completion of the projects.
Rates of Expenditure perNevada Texas New YorkRhode Island
Mileofruralroad* $211 $417 $1,272 $1,479
Square mile of area 45 310 2,149 3,716
Capita* 45 13 8 5
*Population1940, rural road expenditures 1941.PUBLIC WORKS, GRANTS, AND BUSINESS CYCLES 109
sions concerning public works is in operation, although not enough time
has elapsed to appraise its countercycical effectiveness. And the Colmer
Committee, the Committee on Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations, the
Hoover Commission, etc., have made various suggestions, influenced by
Australian examples, for establishing some regular intergovernmental body
in the United States. For advisory purposes such a body might be useful.
But operation of a countercycical public works program may require a
body, or a single administrator, with power to act. Under our system of
government this is hard enough to achieve even at the federal level.
A scheme has been proposed that would call for the establishment in the
executive branch of a board with power to review all projects, federal,
state, and local. Concerned with review and not with the preparation of
projects,57 it would control their timing, approve state-local projects after
Congress had authorized federal funds so that steps could safely be taken
to place projects under construction, and decide (if a variable grant scheme
were in operation) in accordance with a statutory provision what the
federal percentage should be. Congress might have to vote a continuing
appropriation and to forego, within broad limits, its yearly right to fix the
amount to be spent. Under stress of depression in 1933 Congress through
the National Industrial Recovery Act appropriated to the Executive the
large sum of $3,300 million, and placed broad discretionary power in the
Executive concerning its allocation. As already said, the experience of
FERA and WPA supplies some evidence that wide discretionary power
in the hands of an administrator concerning the allocation of federal money
among state-local governments may be unwise. Its justification then was a
depression that had deepened and lengthened beyond all expectation.
Action in advance of such an emergency should remove this justification
and allow an administrator, or board, to be somewhat protected from pres-
sures by working within the limits of objective criteria. The opposite
danger of tying the hands of an administrator, or board, is equally to be
avoided. An in-between scheme, involving some administrative discretion
This would be left with the agency or bureau functionally best equipped to pass
upon the intrinsic usefulness of projects. On these matters the Hoover Commission
and its task forces spoke with a divided voice. The majority of the Commission, as
part of its recommendation of an enlarged Department of the Interior, recommended
the creation of a Board of Impartial Analysis for Engineering and Architectural
Projects to "review projects not only from a technical point of view but also in their
relation to the economy of the country" (Reorganization of the Department of the
Interior, p. 4). It would not, apparently, be concerned with grant programs. Com-
missioners Acheson, Pollock, and Rowe wanted a Board of Review set up directly
under the President to coordinate all projects of public works (ibid., pp. 75-6). The
Task Force Report on Public Works favored the organization of a Department of
Public Works.110 CHAPTER.4
and some objective determination of federal action, might be worked out.58
An arrangement embracing many governments is bound to be cumber-
some, and when it deals with construction projects that take time to start
and complete, obviously care must be taken to reduce inflexibilities.
FAuthority to Lend
Another element that logically seems to belong in a coordinated public
works scheme is federal power to lend to state and local governments.
When state and local governments are unwilling or unable to provide their
share of the expenditure,59 the federal government might wish to make it
easy and attractive for them to borrow in depression. The tax sources of
most local governments and of some state governments are quite inelastic;
their ability to borrow in the market may be limited by statutory restric-
tions and by the difficulty of getting reasonable terms. Net borrowing of
state-local governments was a negative amount in 1933-38. Private lenders
in depression are deterred by the risk of loss and lack of liquidity. The
merits of lending to state and local governments for the sake of increasing
employment are not their affair. Yet, as the experience of PWA shows,
loans of this sort may be 'safe' if marketability after the depression is the
test. Another reason a federal public works agency might want the power
to lend is that loans are likely to be expansionary.6° If state and local
governments in depression secure their share of construction expenditure
by increased taxation, especially by taxing consumption, the net effect of
the grant scheme on the economy might be income decreasing.6' The spread
For example, the law might stipulate that changes in the federal percentage as
specified would become effective 30 days after announcement unless vetoed by con-
current resolution of the Congress.
The U.S. Public Work Reserve found that most state and local governments had
little idea how they might finance future public works. A reluctance to plan new
bond issues was evident, as well as a tendency to expect federal assistance. Higgins,
International Labor Review, November 1944, p. 597.
Higgins has pointed out that "fiscal timing" of public works, shifting the proportion
financed by current revenues, is more flexible than physical timing (Public Invest-
ment and Full Employment, p. 47). With the present high built-in flexibility of
federal revenues the shift from an over-all surplus to a deficit and vice versa will be
almost automatic; therefore no special steps seem necessary to make "fiscal timing"
effective for federal public works. But for state and local governments, built-in
flexibility is much less (short of a very serious depression that brought a vast growth
of tax delinquency); moreover, they appear to be more likely than the federal govern-
ment to enact new levies in depression.
°'Loansare likely to be expansionary because in depression purchases of government
securities are likely to be made from savings or through monetary expansion. On the
other hand, an expansion of construction expenditure financed by taxes on consump-
tion may, by restricting consumption, neutralize or more than neutralize the stimula-
tive effect of the increased government spending.PUBLIC WORKS, GRANTS, AND BUSINESS CYCLES 111
ofcommodity taxes in the 193 0's indicates that some of the expansionary
effect of increased spending was thereby drained away. In short, a scheme
is indicated by which, in depression, grants are supplemented by loans
from the federal government. In prosperity, on the other hand, no new
loans would be extended, and the lending agency might sell its assets to
private investors.
An observer who is impressed with the numerous and diverse needs for
an enlarged current program of public works may worry that a counter-
cyclical program might be too successful. If somehow the nation should
achieve high employment for many years, a plan requiring that public
works be held back until depression might reduce total public works below
a desirable level. Public officials, waiting for a drop in private construction
that did not cOme, would authorize construction of too few highways,
.streets, dams, etc. At present mOst public officials responsible for construc-
tion are acutely conscious of unfilled needs. For example, engineers and
administrators regard the rate of construction and maintenance of high-
ways as 40-50 percent below the level of adequacy. Apart from the
wartime postponements and the postwar rise in prices, the reason is that,
until recently, research in the functional, as distinct from the structural,
design of highways has lagged. Today, however, highway engineers believe
that they know how to design highways —width,grade, alignment, traffic
interchanges, and dividing strips —tomeet given conditions of traffic
demand. Standards of road and structural design have been widely accepted
for different conditions of traffic demand, and estimates of a desirable
10-20 year program based on their application indicate that the highway
plant is grossly inadequate.62 To bring present plant up to standards now
judged adequate for the traffic of today would, according to some estimates,
require a capital expenditure of perhaps $30 to $40 billion, and if traffic
needs for the next 15 years are reckoned, more than $55billionat 1948
prices. Similar, although less well documented, estimates could be pre-
sented for other areas of public construction.
Part of the answer to these fears is that no basis exists in history or
analysis for assuming that depressions will not recur.63 The key variable
to which public construction in a countercyclical program is to be inversely
geared is private construction, and its variability appears to be rooted in
our economic system.
02SeeHighway Needs of the National Defense, Public Roads Administration, Aug.
1949 (mimeographed); G. P. St. Clair, Nation-wide Requirements of the Highway
Program (Speech delivered at the National Tax Conference, Denver, Oct. 4, 1948).
"For the present, obituaries on the business cycle are romantic expressions of
human impatience, not records of solid achievement." Arthur F. Burns, New Facts
on Business Cycl4s, 30th Annual Report, NBER, 1950, p. 3,112 CHAPTER 4
Another part of the answer is that a countercydical program does not
assume an unchanging average level of need for public construction. Our
civilization has developed new areas of public construction and enlarged
old areas. Governmental action and standards can be expected to conform
to the needs of a changing society. And if depressions continue to occur,
the countercyclical program may be used to reach more rapidly the level
of adequacy for public construction the engineers desire. During prosperity
public construction has lagged somewhat behind private; when severe
depression came, public construction was postponed because of the fiscal
weakness of state and local governments. If the countercyclical basis for
public works could be made effective, and if Congress was convinced that
the engineers had a case, in depression a program for achieving adequacy
in public construction could be accelerated. Deceleration of public con-
struction during the boom would be an extra justification for a more rapid
rate in depression.
Other critics of the countercyclical plan make a very different complaint,
arguing that if public construction can be timed so as to expand promptly
in depression, slackening in the recovery will not be equally effective. Some
projects, once started, have to be carried through to completion even in the
face of active private construction. What are usually termed 'political'
pressures also may operate against a reduction of spending. Some defense
against these pressures may be offered by a scheme tied rigidly to objective
criteria. But the main line of defense would probably be an administrative
set-up that made countercyclical spending the touchstone of policy.
The unlikelihood of postponement of public works in prosperity, to-
gether with a scepticism concerning Congressional willingness to enact
and retain a logical scheme, will lead some persons to the conclusion that
nothing should be attempted. The basic difficulty with this attitude is that,
in the event of depression, public works are almost certain to be expanded
and have all the defects inherent in hasty improvisation. Undoubtedly the
best time to undertake most public works is during recession and the worst
time during a boom. A public program to make this effective would seem
worthy of attention.